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Abstract—
Analyzing Android applications for malicious behavior is an
important area of research, and is made difficult, in part, by
the increasingly large number of applications available for the
platform. While techniques exist to perform static analysis on a
large number of applications, dynamic analysis techniques are
relatively limited in scale due to the computational resources
required to emulate the full Android system to achieve accurate
execution. We present Andlantis, a scalable dynamic analysis
system capable of processing over 3000 Android applications
per hour. During this processing, the system is able to collect
valuable forensic data, which helps reverse-engineers and mal-
ware researchers identify and understand anomalous application
behavior. We discuss the results of running 1261 malware samples
through the system, and provide examples of malware analysis
performed with the resulting data.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the marketshare and popularity of the Android platform
has expanded, the number of applications available to users has
increased dramatically. It is estimated that 70% of the worlds
smartphones run Android, with over 900,000 applications
available on the official Google application store as of May
2013 [1]. This has made Android a tempting target for malware
authors, and is the victim of 92% of mobile malware threats
[2].
In an attempt to get a better understanding of the nature
of this large volume of executable code, researchers employ a
combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques. Static
analysis—the analysis of a program’s source or byte code to
determine behavior—is much easier to scale, due to its reliance
on data operations that are easily accelerated and parallelized.
Previous static methods have scaled to hundreds of thousands
of Android applications[12]. However, dynamic analysis—
observing the program’s execution to determine behavior—is
much harder to scale due to the need to accurately replicate
the desired execution environment, usually through the use of
emulation or virtualization. In many cases, dynamic analysis
is necessary to uncover vulnerabilities too complicated for
static analysis, or discover flaws in program logic only known
at runtime (e.g. dynamic dispatch). In addition to simply
emulating the applications, the researcher must also obtain
enough data from the running applications to detect the desired
behaviors, adding an extra level of complexity to an already
large computational burden.
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In this paper, we present Andlantis: a highly scalable
dynamic analysis framework for analyzing applications on
the Android operating system. Andlantis runs the Android
operating system in a virtualized environment and is able
to provide the virtual device with artificial network data in
order to provide an environment which closely replicates that
of a physical device. Andlantis is able to schedule and run
thousands of Android instances in parallel, enabling us to
investigate the behavior of mobile malware at scale.
Andlantis employs a scalable high-performance emulytics
framework, minimega, to parallelize this expensive task as
much as possible and achieve a level of throughput un-
precedented in Android dynamic analysis. Minimega provides
the ability to coordinate and distribute our analysis across a
cluster constructed from inexpensive, commodity hardware.
Our experiment framework captures an application’s disk
and network activity, which is further parsed for anomalous
behavior. Additionally, we are able to run applications within
different operating environments and compare the results for
interesting behavioral differences.
The rest of this paper provides: a description and analysis
of related work, a detailed description of the Andlantis archi-
tecture, the results of our experiments on Android malware
using Andlantis, an evaluation of the Andlantis system, a de-
scription of the limitations and future work, and a concluding
section.
II. RELATED WORK
To date, there have been a number of frameworks designed
for the analysis of Android applications. We can classify these
as static analysis [13], [9], [10], [18] and dynamic analysis [8],
[5], [7], [19], [17], [15], [6], [4], [14] frameworks.
In [18], Schmidt et. al. utilize machine learning techniques
to identify malicious binaries in Android applications through
the extraction of functions and function calls found in the ELF
binaries.
RiskRanker and Andarwin[13], [9] are scalable frameworks
which provide valuable insight to Android application behav-
ior. RiskRanker utilizes a variety of static analysis techniques
to detect malware on Android devices. These techniques in-
clude program control flow graph evaluation and evaluation
of byte code signatures. AnDarwin is designed for the scal-
able detection of plagiarized applications. This is performed
through the construction of a Program Dependency Graph
(PDG) of the Android application. A semantic vector is then
extracted from the PDG to represent the application, which can
then be quickly compared with the semantic vectors of other
applications.
These papers are relevant because they address the issue
of scale, analyzing malware signature generation and cloned
application detection, respectively. However, we are interested
in the dynamic analysis of Android applications, which gives
insight into runtime behavior.
The work that comes closest to our work in scalable dy-
namic Android analysis is Crowdroid [6]. This paper creates a
scalable analysis framework by crowdsourcing its data collec-
tion. It relies on users to run applications on their phones and
send back information to a centralized server. While this is very
similar to our companion application, Arkhunter, (described in
the Discussion section), it only scales well when there are a
large number of active users on the system. There may also be
problems with users tampering with, or skewing the data based
on their usage of the application. Andlantis avoids these issues
by running the dynamic analysis on a collection of virtual
Android devices instead of using a crowdsourced platform.
Similarly, Mahmood et. al developed a scalable dynamic
analysis framework for analyzing Android applications in the
cloud [17]. Their platform utilizes the robotium test automation
framework to drive the user interfaces of the applications.
Robotium allows for blackbox testing of Android applications
through the development of a companion (testing) app that
is installed alongside the testee application. The robotium
platform requires the testee app to be signed in debug mode.
Because production applications are rarely signed in debug
mode, they must be resigned in order to work with robotium.
Application signatures can be checked by the application
during runtime, and applications may break or significantly
reduce functionality if they detect they have been resigned.
Because we are interested in the dynamic analysis of Android
malware, we wish to avoid conflicting behaviors that occur
when an application is modified. Andlantis can reap the benefit
of operating on unaltered applications.
[4] and [14] detail Android dynamic analysis frameworks
emphasizing coverage and target analysis. [4] achieved an
activity coverage rate above 60% – over twice the coverage
of human interaction with the same applications. [14] details
a programmable framework for Android UI interaction that
allows for flexibility in state exploration and easy access to
program state.
Other works ([15], [5]) utilize Android’s Monkey tool [3] to
drive the UI of applications on an Android emulator. Monkey
runs on the Android emulator, and exercises the application
through user interface manipulation. Monkey does not require
applications to be signed in debug mode, which is very impor-
tant to our application of the Andlantis framework. Despite the
fact that these dynamic analysis tools do not require application
modification, their frameworks are not designed to scale to
hundreds or thousands of nodes like Andlantis.
Although static analysis frameworks [13], [9] are scalable
and provide valuable insight to Android application behavior,
our work is focused on building a scalable dynamic analysis
framework for evaluation of Android application behaviors
during runtime.
III. ARCHITECTURE
As seen in Figure 1, our system is divided up into three
main components: a malware analysis repository (FARM[20]),
a distribution system built on top of a cluster management
framework (Minimega[11]), and a behavioral analysis environ-
ment to capture forensic data. It runs on a large commodity
cluster.
1) Kane: Commodity Cluster for Malware Analysis: In
order to provide a safe, scalable, and reliable environment
for the analysis of malware, we constructed Kane, a 520-
node system consisting of reasonably priced commodity PCs.
Each node is capable of hosting between 8 and 20 virtual
machines, depending on the CPU and RAM requirements of
the application and guest OS. The systems are intentionally
diskless and PXE boot from a collection of experiment images
stored on the cluster head node. Because there are no disks,
even malware employing VM breakout techniques will have
difficulty infecting the host machine permanently. A simple
reboot will wipe the node clean, and any damage the malware
could cause to other systems would be limited because our
system’s internal network has no connection out to the Internet.
2) FARM: Malware collection and organization: The
Forensics Analysis Repository for Malware (FARM) is the
primary input to our system. FARM stores known-bad, known-
good, and unknown applications, as well as the results from
automated analysis tools. Researchers and analysts can request
a file to be analyzed by various systems, including Andlantis.
In addition to managing the results from automated tools,
FARM is able to leverage its large repository of malware
to correlate information across samples. As mobile malware
techniques approach the sophistication of PC-based malware,
it will only become more important to be able to compare
samples across different platforms for similar behavior and
functionality.
3) Andlantis Agent: Job control: When an analyst selects
a sample for examination, it is sent to the control node of our
cluster. Here, a scheduling program locates a node with enough
available resources to run the job. When a node is found, the
Android APK is sent to the node, along with the instructions
for dynamic analysis and emulator configuration. If no nodes
exist with the resources necessary for the experiment, the
scheduler will wait until a node becomes available.
4) Minimega: large-scale VM management: In order to
control all the various parts of Kane, we use minimega, an
open-source framework for deploying and managing networks
of virtual machines across a large number of systems. Min-
imega was originally developed to study large-scale emulytics
by creating networks of hundreds of thousands of networked
VMs. It uses a mesh networking strategy to efficiently prop-
agate commands and files to all or a subset of the nodes
in our cluster, and provides a simple interface to control
both the deployment of virtualized experiments, as well as
the network topology crucial to isolating each experiment.
Minimega supports Intel based Android VMs, which this work
leverages to support thousands of concurrent analyses.
5) Application interaction (Dynamic Analysis): Initially,
we developed Andlantis to launch highly parallelized virtual
environments using the x86 Android architecture. However,
we quickly discovered that the x86 images do not come with
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the Google Maps API, which many applications require in
order to run. In order to retain this functionality, we added the
Google Maps API to the x86 images. We also disabled the
callbacks to the Google Bouncer service, which is intended
to prevent malware from being installed on Android devices.
Because Andlantis was developed to analyze malware, Google
Bouncer checks often impeded our research, or would cause
installs to hang if we did not have network connectivity.
Each emulator’s GUI is controlled via an application uti-
lizing the MonkeyRunner and AndroidViewClient frameworks
to achieve easy and customizable UI exploration. By utilizing
MonkeyRunner, we can control the behavior of the application
and interact with the application’s UI from outside of the
Android code. The system will, depending on the kind of
analysis requested, interact with an application’s clickable,
scrollable, and typable objects in various different patterns. In-
teraction patterns are recorded, along with application crashes,
allowing us to determine what series of input events triggered a
particular application behavior. In our current implementation,
the UI stimulation attempts to visit as many features of the
application as possible. If we reach a state in which there are no
more UI elements to visit, we will visit the previous UI state,
and try to traverse a new path by interacting with UI elements
that have not yet been stimulated. Although this method may
not cover all functionality of the application (e.g. it has trouble
with text fields requiring specific information such as phone
numbers and multitouch interaction), it allows us to observe
many of the features of the application during runtime.
Each virtual experiment involves two virtual instances. One
is the experimental instance on which the sample is installed
and run. The other runs iNetSim[16], “a software suite for
simulating common internet services in a lab environment”.
An isolated virtual network segment connects the two nodes.
This iNetSim node will respond to network requests made by
the emulator, spurring malicious samples to expose additional
functionality. The host machine captures all network traffic on
this network for later analysis.
A. The Life of an Andlantis Job
When an analyst using FARM wants to analyze an ap-
plication, it is retrieved from the repository and sent, along
with various job-related metadata, to the Andlantis agent on
the head node of the Kane cluster. Upon receiving the request,
the Andlantis agent leverages minimega’s scheduler to locate a
node in the cluster with available CPU and RAM. This node,
Node X, creates a new Android emulator and iNetSim instance.
Once the emulator and iNetSim instances are booted, the head
node sends the APK to be analyzed to Node X for deployment.
Node X installs the APK into the emulator, launches the main
activity of the contained application, and begins the automated
interaction. After a period of time (currently configured for
5 minutes), the emulator is stopped, and its disk images are
retained for analysis. During the forensics phase, the disk
images are loop-mounted on the host node’s filesystem and
a simple filesystem comparison is run against the original
Android image to determine what changes the target program
made. The differences are categorized into created, modified,
and deleted files. The created and modified files are copied
from the disk image for future analysis. The files, metadata,
and network traffic generated from the application’s execution
are then archived and by the head node, where they are made
available to FARM for inspection.
IV. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the Andlantis system, we chose to run
the set of applications from the Android Malware Genome
Project[21]. The dataset contains 1261 malware samples col-
lected between August 2010 and September 2011. This al-
lowed us to both test our system at scale, and to evaluate
the behavior of known Android malware in the controlled
Andlantis environment.
A. Job Scheduling
In order to send Android applications (.apk files) to nodes
on our cluster for analysis, we wrote a scheduling program
to manage the distribution. Using the minimega framework,
the scheduler sends a broadcast message to all the nodes,
requesting usage statistics (available RAM and CPU load
average). All nodes with enough available resources are added
to a queue. Each job is then sent to the next node in the
queue. Once the queue empties, we repeat the processes. If
no nodes meet the resource requirement, the scheduler waits
for a configurable timeout period before retrying. As jobs are
completed on the nodes, resources will be made available for
new jobs to use. After a job has run for a specified time
(generally 5 minutes), the scheduler stops the job, collects the
resulting data from the appropriate node and cleans up the files
used for the job. The entire scheduling routine is performed in
parallel in order to maximize the efficiency of the process.
B. Performance
We ran the Malware Genome Project set on a commodity
cluster of 200 nodes. Each diskless node contains 12GB of
RAM and a quad-core, 2.8GHz Intel Core i7 CPU. Because
we were running at such a large scale, occasional problems
with the nodes are to be expected. Hardware issues on 12 of
the nodes rendered them useless for our analysis, so the actual
test ran on 188 of the 200 nodes. During our experiment, 38
jobs did not complete because of errors related to the Android
virtual machines. The leading cause of virtual machine prob-
lems was emulator time-out while waiting to acquire an IP
address. This problem is nondeterministic and can be resolved
by resubmitting the job until it successfully acquires an IP.
In this experiment, we chose to simply abandon the job if it
failed, although failure recovery logic can be easily added to
the scheduler. Since the VM failure rate is only 3%, we believe
it has only marginal impact on the efficacy of Andlantis and
leave the addition of failure recovery logic to future work.
The entire run of 1261 samples was completed in 24
minutes, 25 seconds. Each Android application was stimulated
for 5 minutes before the app was closed and results were
collected. Theoretically, with 1261 applications each running
for 5 minutes, and 188 nodes, we could run the entire
experiment in just over 11 minutes, assuming three virtual
machines per node. In practice, we found that running more
than three virtual machines concurrently would saturate the
available resources on our nodes. Obviously, this number is
largely hardware dependent. The seemingly large discrepancy
between the theoretical runtime and the actual runtime is
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largely due to wait times we have introduced in order to avoid
timing issues. For example, we must wait for a period of time
after the emulator boots before we check if it has acquired
an IP address. We must choose between waiting too long and
sacrificing performance, and not waiting long enough which
results in failed jobs. Other wait times are introduced after
kicking off the forensics analysis scripts. All of these wait
times are configurable, and for our current implementation,
we have a total of 220 seconds of wait time, excluding the
5 minutes we must wait for the stimulation of the Android
application. In total, we must wait at least 520 seconds for each
job to complete. Our theoretical runtime with no additional
overhead now jumps to 19 minutes 23 seconds. This means
that our system incurs approximately five minutes of overhead
(roughly 0.25 seconds per job) associated with scheduling and
transferring files to/from the nodes.
C. Scalability
The Andlantis system naturally scales extremely well. As
shown in Figure 2, we tested the Malware Genome Project
set on Andlantis with a variable number of nodes (ranging
from 20 to 188). The dotted line represents the theoretical
speedup, while the dots represent our observed speedup with
a given number of nodes. We can see that with the number
of nodes tested, we have approximately linear strong scaling
speedup. As the number of nodes increases, the cost of the
dynamic analysis computation becomes less of an issue and
the performance is bound by the communication costs to send
and receive data to the nodes. This is shown in Figure 4. With
20 nodes, communication cost accounts for less than 4% of
the total execution time. When we scale to 188 nodes, almost
25% of the execution time is used for communication with the
nodes. The total runtime for the experiments is displayed in
Figure 3. With 20 nodes, our total runtime was well over three
hours and total runtime decreased as more nodes were added.
The use of Minimega facilitates automatically scaling to
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available resources by simply allowing new Minimega in-
stances (nodes) to connect and disconnect. Minimega auto-
matically includes participating nodes as available resources
for scheduling. If new nodes are more powerful than the nodes
currently in the network, the Andlantis scheduler will detect
the available resources and be able to schedule more jobs on
the new node than on existing nodes. Likewise, if the new
node is less powerful, it may only be able to schedule one
job (or none if it is a very low power computer). This system
makes Andlantis very dynamic, as more nodes can be simply
plugged into the network. Likewise, Andlantis is robust to
issues such as node failures. If a node goes down, it will fail to
respond to queries from the scheduler and therefore will never
be scheduled. When the node comes back, it will automatically
be detected by the system.
V. FINDINGS
The Andlantis system can be used to evaluate thousands of
Android applications in a short amount of time. For our initial
malware analysis run, we focused our efforts on the forensic
evaluation of Android applications found in the Malware
Genome Project set. Manual inspection was performed on
applications found to have suspicious changes to their file
system after five minutes of stimulation. Our analysis is not
focused on finding new class of malware, rather observing the
behavior of known Android malware. We present an overview
a few families of malware detected by the Andlantis system,
and detail our findings:
A. AndroidOS/DroidKrungFu.A
The DroidKrungFu.A family of malware contains a trojan
that sends personal information from the device to a command
and control server. This information includes the contents of
the memory card, IMEI, the mobile device number and the
Android SDK version. In the applications in our analysis
dataset, the DroidKrungFu.A malware was found packaged in
an application advertised as a text reader. When the application
was installed onto our device, it would also create a file named
/data/media/0/txtbooks/legacy. This file appears to be a normal
data file, and is even placed in a directory titled txtbooks so
as not to raise suspicion. However, the legacy file is actually
and Android APK file, and we observed the installation of
this APK on the device through our stimulation via dynamic
analysis.
B. AndroidOS/Anserver.A
Anserver.A is a class of Android malware targeted at
stealing personal information from mobile devices. The mal-
ware will periodically phone home to various public blogging
websites, where it finds the URLs of new command and control
servers. Like the DroidKrungFu.A family, the Anserver.A mal-
ware is commonly found packaged in other applications. The
most common instances of the malware contain a file named
anserva.db which is an Android APK file. The encompassing
application will then entice the user into installing the malware,
promising added functionality for their device. In addition to
allowing us to track the behavior of the Anserver.A malware,
Andlantis system allowed us to observe the common methods
the malware used to persuade the user into installing the
malware.
C. j.SMSHider
The j.SMSHider Android malware, like the other malware
families discussed, is designed to gather personal information
from Android devices. This information includes the phone
number and GPS location of the victim. The malware will
upload this information to a server roughly every five minutes.
The application will also delete SMS messages to and from
certain numbers. This malware differs from the previously
examined families in that the malicious application gains root
access on the device. This means that the application has
privileged control of the device, usually reserved for the An-
droid operating system, and not for installed applications. Our
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analysis allowed us to determine that the installed application
had gained root access on the device, which immediately raised
red flags. This gives us a large improvement over static analysis
of APK files, as we are able to observe the state of the Android
system during runtime.
VI. DISCUSSION
Andlatis is able to perform large-scale dynamic analysis
on Android applications in an emulated environment. It is the
most scalable solution to date and is flexible enough to handle
more advanced dynamic analysis techniques. Currently, we are
able to process 1261 Android applications in about 25 minutes,
which equates to about 3026 .apk files per hour (running them
each for five minutes). This means that we can run the entire
set of 1000000 applications available on the official Android
marketplace, Google Play, in just under two weeks. Android
system developers as well as application developers could use
this tool to detect application crashes and trace the precise steps
that resulted in the crash. This data could be used to improve
the Android API, or to fix bugs existing in applications.
Although our platform is able to successfully stimulate
applications and, in our case, gather forensics data, it is often
useful to manually navigate through an application in order to
increase coverage or activate specialized functionality within
the application. To facilitate these capabilities, we developed
a companion application to Andlantis for forensics analysis,
which we named Arkhunter.
A. Arkhunter
Arkhunter is a lightweight, standalone application that can
be installed on any Android device. To use Arkhunter, the user
simply opens the application and selects the “scan device”
option. Once selected, Arkhunter will gather information on
every file on the device. This information includes crypto-
graphic hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256), the absolute file path
of the files, and the status information of the files. The status
information is equivalent to the information found in the stat
system call.
Unfortunately, this information is not easily obtainable
from standard Java libraries. To gather this information, we
used the Android Native Development Kit (NDK) to write
a C function to make the stat call and return the relevant
information back to the Java application. This consists of the
ID of the device containing the file, inode number, permissions,
number of hard links, user ID of the owner, group ID of the
owner, device ID if the file is a special file, filesize, blocksize,
number of blocks allocated, time of last access, time of last
modification and time of last status change. This information
is then packed into a JSON object that can be saved locally or
exported to a remote server. The format of this data is identical
to the format of the Andlantis forensics data, which enables
researchers to easily integrate data from both Andlantis and
Arkhunter. In our testing, this data was analyzed by the FARM
system. As displayed in Figure 5, Arkhunter is easily added
to FARM along side the Andlantis system in order to perform
more customized forensics analysis of Android applications on
a real device.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While we have achieved a significant step forward in
scalable Android application analysis, this work does have its
limitations. It is implied by the nature of dynamic analysis, but
bears repeating, that the quality of results gained by our system
is dependent on the actual percentage of an app’s code that is
executed, and therefore the means by which this execution
occurs.
In our system, this is the UI exploration mechanism,
which currently uses a rather naive algorithm of interacting
with random clickable and typable UI elements. With more
intelligent algorithms, an increase in coverage can be attained.
However, there are likely significant diminishing returns from
this, since many Android apps have behaviors that simply
cannot reasonably be activated without human intervention.
The behaviors include application-specific login prompts, ap-
plications that dynamically load content or code from network
resources, etc.
In the future, our first step will be to tackle the above
problem most directly by developing a means by which to mea-
sure code coverage during execution in Android applications.
One could hypothesize various methods for doing this, such as
application rewriting, or through the use of the Java debugging
framework, but the pros and cons of these methods need to be
evaluated. With this accomplished, the coverage data can then
be used to evaluate various improvements to our exploration
and interaction mechanisms. One of the most important of
these improvements is the use of Google’s ”Goldfish” Android
emulator, which will allow us to manipulate simulated network
parameters, send and receive text messages, spoof hardware
sensor data, and so on.
Additionally, we recognize that due to the fragmented
nature of Android, applications will behave differently based
on the API level and architecture of the device they are running
on. While our emulators run Android 4.2 on the x86 architec-
ture, we could get more complete data by supporting other
variants, which are the most common targets for malware.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have developed Andlantis, a highly scalable system for
the dynamic analysis of Android applications. This system,
at its current state, has the capacity to process over 3000
applications per hour, and can greatly exceed this number with
additional hardware. Andlantis is robust to node failures, and
has a very low job failure rate of just 3%.
We have shown the ability to evaluate the forensic footprint
left by three common families of mobile malware (Droid-
KrungFu.A, Anserver.A and j.SMSHider) and are able to
further evaluate runtime behaviors and network traffic of these
malicious applications. The ability to evaluate thousands of
applications in parallel allows forensics experts to focus their
time on the more dangerous, or more forensically interesting
applications.
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